LEGAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE BUSWAY

Regional Transit Alternatives Analysis

The RTAA was a comprehensive planning information document, prepared by MTA and released in October of 1998. It discussed a number of ways to meet the transportation needs of the county. A key section compared various modes of rapid transit -- rapid bus (either on arterial streets or on bus transitways), light rail and heavy rail. The RTAA listed these weaknesses for bus-based transit services:

• Bus service may not provide as significant economic redevelopment as rail lines
• Elements of the community indicate strong support for rail projects
• Bus capacity is the lowest of the three modes
• The system is generally slower and less reliable than (rail at) aerial or below-grade
• "Robbins Bill" prohibits at-grade operation over a section of the Valley alignment

The RTAA also ranked light rail on the Burbank-Chandler alignment just slightly behind a heavy rail (subway) in terms of passenger mobility and reliability, and equal in terms of cost-effectiveness; it ranked equal to a bus transitway in terms of community impact. Light rail had the best potential ridership of the three modes on this corridor -- 23,400 daily, compared to 16,100 for bus and 15,900 for subway (it should be noted that the comparison was based on light rail or busway from North Hollywood to Warner Center vs. subway extension to I-405). Rail scored higher than bus in environmental concerns and light rail scored highest in terms of improvement of the economy in the area.
Robbins Bill

MTA got an amendment to this law passed via a technical corrections bill of AB 2928, the Governor's 2000 Transportation Budget. The amendment was not mentioned in any of the analyses until the very last one, Senate Floor 9/5/01. The additional word in subdivision (c) which appears to have been added to the law to favor the busway project has been highlighted in bold.
(Thanks to Tom Rubin and Dana Gabbard for researching this.)

SB 211, introduced by then-State Senator Alan Robbins in 1991, added Section 130265 to the Public Utilities Code, which placed specific restrictions on development of the Burbank-Chandler right-of-way for transit purposes. The three key subdivisions of §130265 are (emphasis in red mine):

1. In the area between the western curb of Hazeltine Avenue and a line parallel to and 50 feet west of the western edge of the Hollywood Freeway, there may not be constructed any exclusive public mass transit rail guideway, rail rapid transit or light rail system, or other track, other than as a subway system that is covered and below grade.
2. In the area described in subdivision (c), no station may be constructed, other than a station where the main entrance is located on property that is currently part of the Los Angeles Valley College campus or on that portion of the existing railroad right-of-way located north of Burbank Boulevard and east of Fulton Avenue.
3. In the area below Tujunga Wash and at least one mile to the east and west of Tujunga Wash, there may not be constructed any exclusive mass transit rail guideway, rail rapid transit or light rail system, or other track, other than as a subway using boring technology as a deep bore subway located at least 25 feet below ground, measured from the existing ground level to the top of the tunnel.

There is still language in §130265 that causes problems for the busway. The Legislature did not modify subdivision (b) to remove language prohibiting a station to be constructed at Laurel Canyon Blvd., since subdivision (c) identifies a segment of the right-of-way that extends east of that street. In addition, subdivision (d) -- also unmodified -- specifically defines statutorily the route configuration adopted by the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC; MTA's predecessor) on February 28, 1990; that configuration specified a subway extension or "advanced technology transit".

One problem: Supervisor Zev Yaroslavsky placed on the ballot -- and the voters passed -- the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) Reform and Accountability Act of 1998, a knee-jerk reaction to various problems; Section 7 of the Act prohibits MTA from using sales tax revenue to construct subways.
Proposition 108

The LACTC purchased the Burbank-Chandler right-of-way from the Southern Pacific Transportation Company on March 12, 1991. $44.8 million of the purchase funding came from the California Transportation Commission (CTC) in the form of Proposition 108 (the Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1990) funds.

Proposition 108 provided for a bond issue to fund rail transit programs. It created a new section (2701) of the Streets and Highways Code covering the issuance of the bonds and the use of the funds created by those bond issues. Specifically, §2701.06 reads (again, emphasis mine):

The money in the fund, upon appropriation by the Legislature, shall be available, without regard to fiscal years, for acquisition of rights-of-way, capital expenditures, and acquisition of rolling stock for intercity rail, passenger rail, and urban rail transit and for capital improvements which directly support rail transportation, including exclusive busways which are converted within 10 years after completion of construction into rail lines, grade separations to enhance rail passenger service, and multimodal terminals.

Among the corridors identified in §2701.07 is the "San Fernando Valley extension" of Metro Rail (separate from the segment from Wilshire/Alvarado to Lankershim/Chandler). The California Transportation Commission approved that funding as Resolution No. BFP-91-18, which was formally executed on April 10, 1992 to cover a portion of the funds LACTC had used to purchase the right-of-way from Southern Pacific. §2.4 of that resolution reads, in part:

(The) CTC shall be entitled to a then-present value refund, or credit, at State's option, equivalent to the proportionate funding participation by the State and other public funds toward property acquisition and project construction in the event that the LACTC, or (Metrolink), or their constituent members, or successor public entities, cease to utilize this project for the intended public passenger rail purposes.

This obligation was acknowledged by then-CEO Franklin White in his October 21, 1994 memo to the MTA board of directors in which he responded to questions raised at the October 13 Planning and Programming Committee meeting:

Question: Does the MTA incur any financial loss if it does not build a rail project along this line?
Response: MTA ... has an obligation to pay the State of California $44.8 million in the event that it does not proceed with a passenger rail project on the SP right-of-way, unless CTC agrees to waive such repayment.

In January, 2001, the CTC allocated $12.3 million in Traffic Congestion Relief Program funding for the San Fernando Valley East-West Bus Rapid Transit Project. However, the allocation documentation -- Resolution No. TA-01-01 -- did not waive the repayment of the Proposition 108 funds, and the EIR makes no provision for an upgrade to rail that would conform with the "Robbins Bill".
Technology Considerations

On October 26, 1994, the MTA board received a report from Ed Vandeventer, then Director of Rail Operations, on the technology to be used for the East-West Transit Project. It listed the potential for line extensions to the north and west and lower traffic congestion at stations as unique advantages for light rail technology on the Burbank-Chandler alignment (the report also compared technology on the Ventura Freeway alignment, since Supervisor "Monorail Mike" Antonovich was still trying to keep that alignment alive at that point in time):

When then-Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan moved to begin the Major Investment Study and the Environmental Impact Report he said that Burbank-Chandler Metro Rail was "the least expensive rail alternative (and) the most cost-effective to operate and maintain."
Major Investment Study

In May, 1996, the MTA board approved the San Fernando Valley East-West Transportation Corridor Major Investment Study, which narrowed the alternatives for developing the Burbank-Chandler right-of-way from ten to five. The alternatives were ranked in order of cost-effectiveness (based on cost per new rider, which is the standard used by the Federal Transit Administration) as follows:

• 9. Enhanced Bus (TSM)
• 1d. Red Line aerial extension to I-405
• 6a. Light Rail to Valley Circle, at-grade
• 1c. Red Line open-air extension to I-405
• 1b. Red Line cut-and-cover extension to I-405
• 2. Red Line deep-bore extension to I-405 via Oxnard St.
• 1a. Red Line deep-bore extension to I-405
• 6b. Light Rail to Valley Circle, cut-and-cover

The options that were removed from consideration as being less cost-effective were:

• 8. Busway to Warner Center
• 4d. Red Line aerial extension to Valley Circle
• 4c. Red Line open-air extension to Valley Circle
• 4b. Red Line cut-and-cover extension to Valley Circle
• 5. Red Line deep-bore extension to Valley Circle via Oxnard St. and Sherman Way
• 4a. Red Line deep-bore extension to Valley Circle
• 7. Alternative Rail Technology to Chatsworth
• 3a. Light Rail to I-405, at-grade
• 3b. Light Rail to I-405, cut-and-cover

A subway extension was ranked less cost-effective when extended west of I-405 because of higher construction costs, but light rail ranked higher along the entire alignment than shortline, because "lower ridership ... (is) offset by significantly lower construction costs". The busway ranked lower because "even with partial signal pre-emption, bus speeds (are) not significantly faster than parallel bus routes on arterial streets" and increasing speed by providing grade separations would increase costs "to approach those of a rail transit alternative".

The MIS said the Enhanced Bus/TSM (Transportation Systems Management) alternative would only improve service on existing bus routes "to the point of maximum efficiency ... after which bus service will degrade due to traffic congestion and slower travel speeds." Only in the West Valley, with lower traffic congestion levels, was TSM judged cost-effective for up to twenty years.

No documentation has ever surfaced disproving the conclusions of the MIS regarding the busway and TSM options.

In addition, it is obvious that the proposed busway stations would work equally well for a light rail line.
Community Opposition to the Environmental Impact Report

The summary of the public hearings on the EIR shows considerable opposition to the busway project. 267 of those testifying were opposed, including 126 favoring the TSM option but not including 166 specifically opposing a busway on Chandler Blvd. and a petition signed by 1,527 residents opposing the Oxnard St. alignment. Only 44 people supported the project without qualifications; another 75 supported the project while opposing one alignment or the other.

Written public comment showed only 31 respondents supporting the project, plus 60 who supported the project while opposing one of the two alignments. 181 opposed the project in its entirety (107 of which supported TSM) and 152 specifically opposed the Chandler Blvd. alignment.

Totals: 448 totally opposed; 1,980 wanting it "somewhere else"; 75 unconditionally supporting it.
Busways Cheaper to Build and Operate?

A study by Kosmont & Associates on the Pasadena Blue Line dated August 25, 1998 documents the fact that a grade-separated busway would cost more, both in capital and operating costs, than at-grade light rail with equivalent speed and capacity. To match at-grade light rail capacity, a busway on the route would have had to be both grade-separated and wider (taking additional property along the right-of-way so buses could pass each other).

Projected cost to finish light rail was $467 million vs. $990 million for a busway. Operating costs: 12 cents higher per passenger mile for busway than light rail.

The study also noted that "light rail trains attract more riders and can absorb more riders with their larger carrying capacity than buses can attract and absorb."
"Use It or Lose It?"

State Assembly Speaker Robert Hertzberg told the MTA board of directors in July that funding for the busway is "use it or lose it."

The funding legislation, in fact, explicitly permits a local agency (in this case, the MTA) to submit a substitute project within two years of passage of AB 2928, if the BRT is not feasible.

Did Speaker Hertzberg fail to tell the truth, or is he simply not knowledgeable about a bill he is listed as the co-author of?
The other potential busway difficulties were discussed in my August, 2000 op-ed article for the Los Angeles Times.

A 2000 Metro Investment Report interview with Zev Yaroslavsky proved how politics motivate MTA decision-making. (In a follow-up interview a year later, Zev made it clear that he still doesn't understand buses are slower than light rail.)
Those interested in the history of the Burbank-Chandler rail corridor can take a photo tour of the old Pacific Electric Santa Monica Blvd.-San Fernando Valley Line, which used Burbank-Chandler until it ceased operation on December 28, 1952. (Provided by Tom Wetzel, a regular contributor to la.transportation).